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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.

Docketing No. 870166-CA

JOHN R. SMINGLER
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does this court have jurisdiction of this matter

due to Defendant's untimely appeal?
2.

Is there sufficient evidencie to affirm the trial

court's finding that Defendant violated the law by not
maintaining a proper lookout?
3.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in

requiring Defendant to pay $100.00 in (restitution?
STATEMENT OF FApTS
On December 9, 1986, Defendant'|s vehicle and a
vehicle driven by Mrs. Janice Bailey cbllided at
approximately 11050 South 1000 East, Skndv, Utah.
5-7.)

(T. at

Defendant was pulling out from |a driveway at Alta

High School.

(T. at 6.)

Mrs. Bailey Was northbound on 1000

East, (T. at 7.), traveling at 25 to 3^) miles per hour.

(T.

at 14.)

The Defendant pulled out into Mrs. Bailey's travel

lane and caused the front end of his vehicle to collide with
the right side of Mrs. Bailey's vehicle.

(T. at 7 and 13.)

After the collision occurred, the two parties brought their
vehicles to a stop, exited the vehicles and conversed with
each other.

While conversing, the Defendant repeatedly

apologized to Mrs. Bailey for the collision.

(T. at 15.)

Officer Gordon Sadler of the Sandy City Police
Department was dispatched to the scene of the accident at
about 4:10 p.m. (T. at 5.)

Based upon his investigation,

Officer Sadler formed the opinion that Mrs. Bailey was in
the process of pulling over to the curb when the collision
occurred.

(T. at 7.)

However, Officer Sadler also

determined that the point of impact was past the white
emergency line into Mrs. Bailey's travel lane.

(T. at 7.)

While at the scene, the defendant told Officer Sadler that a
truck was going northbound on 1000 East, that he intended to
pull out and go northbound also, that the truck then
proceeded to turn into the driveway, and that after the
truck turned, Mrs. Bailey's vehicle also came northbound
when the collision occurred.

(T. at 7.)

However, a few

days later the Defendant came to the Sandy City police
station with his mother to talk to Officer Sadler.
time the Defendant gave a different story.

This

The Defendant

said the truck was going southbound, that he intended to
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turn and go south into the driveway, that he proceeded to
pull out into the street as the truck turned, and after the
truck turned the collision occurred.

(T. at 8,9.)

While at

the scene of the collision Officer Sadler asked to see the
Defendant's drivers license.

The Defendant was unable to

produce a license. (T. at 7,8.)
At the trial Mrs. Bailey testified that she was
intending to pull over to the curb to pick up her son from
school, but not at the location where the collision
occurred.

She was going to pull over further down the

street (T. at 14, 16.)

Mrs. Bailey testified that she could

see the Defendant's vehicle pulling oiit into her lane before
the collision occurred.

(T. at 13.)

The Defendant admitted

at the scene to Officer Sadler that he did not ever see Mrs.
Bailey's vehicle before the collision.

(T. at 8.)

At

trial, the Defendant admitted that the truck blocked his
vision down the street, and that he cobld not see past the
truck to determine if he could pull out safely.

(T. at 21).

Defendant also admitted that in spite of the truck blocking
his line of vision down the street he pulled out into the
street.

(T. at 24.)
After the introduction of evidehce. the Hon. Judge

Phillip K. Palmer stated that the law {provides that whenever
a person is emerging from a driveway, he has a duty to yield
to all vehicles who present an immediate hazard.
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(T. at

24.)

Judge Palmer then stated he believed the most credible

evidence was that the Defendant was out in the roadway, and
that Mrs. Bailey had not changed her course of travel. (T.
at 25.)

Judge Palmer also determined that the Defendant

failed to yield to a vehicle that was lawfully on the
through highway.

(T. at 25.)

Based upon these factual

findings, Judge Palmer concluded that the Defendant violated
the law by failing to maintain a proper lookout. (T. at 25.)
Judge Palmer proceeded to sentence the Defendant.
(T. at 25.)

Judge Palmer informed the Defendant he had a

right to appeal within 30 days.

(T. at 25.)

Judge Palmer

asked the Defendant if he had a part-time job, and the
Defendant said yes.

(T. at 25,26.)

Judge Palmer then

sentenced the Defendant to pay $75.00 on the improper
lookout charge, and $25.00 on the driving without a license
charge, although this charge would be vacated if the
Defendant showed proof of a license within 30 days.
26.)

(T. at

Judge Palmer told the Defendant he may go. (T. at 26.)

However, while Defendant was still present, counsel for
Sandy City asked the Judge if he could check with Mrs.
Bailey concerning any restitution.

(T. at 26.)

Judge

Palmer asked the Defendant if he had any liability
insurance.
(T. at 27.)

The Defendant stated that he did not have any.
Mrs. Bailey stated her insurance company paid

for the repairs, but that she was required to pay a $100.00

4

deductible.

(T. at 27.)

Judge Palmer tnen required the

Defendant as part of his sentence to jf>ay $]00.00 to Mrs.
Bailey.

(T. at 27, 28.)

Defendant that he may go.

Judge Palmed then told the
(T. at 28.j

At no time did the

Defendant object to the imposition of restitution.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This court should dismiss the defendant's appeal due
to lack of jurisdiction.

There is nc jurisdiction because

of the Defendant's untimely filing ofjhis notice of appeal
beyond the 30-day appeal period.
There is sufficient evidence td sunnort the trial
court's conclusion that the Defendant violated the law.
Such facts are that Defendant admitted) to pulling out into
the street without being able to view (oncoming traffic, the
collision occurred in the travel lane portion of the street,
and the Defendant admitted to not havilng se^n the other
vehicle before the collision.
The imposition of restitution wjas appropriate because
all of the parties were before the coujrt: when restitution
was discussed and the trial court askejd the Defendant
certain questions concerning his abilijty to pay which
included whether Defendant had liability insurance.

The

Defendant had ample opportunity to ask| questions concerning
the restitution amount and to object, tut he at no time did
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so and was not prejudiced in any manner by being required to
reimburse the other driver.

ARGUMENT I
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an appeal is to be taken within thirty (30)
days after entry of judgment.
Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

See, §77-35-26(d)(1), Utah
Rule 26 also provides that,

"no appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect
in the taking thereof, or for failure to perfect the
appeal."

§77-35-26(d)(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

The Defendant has failed to perfect his appeal in
that he failed to file his Notice of Appeal within thirty
(30) days after the entry of judgment and sentencing.

The

trial was held, and judgment entered, on April 2, 1987, and
the Defendant was personally notified by Judge Palmer that
he had 30 days to appeal.

Defendant filed a notice of

appeal with this court on May 6, 1987.

This was beyond the

thirty (30) day period prescribed by Rule 26.
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth in the case of
State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979), that the time
within which an appeal must be taken is jurisdictional," and
that the case was not properly before the court because the
appeal was not timely.

Id. at 928, 929.

6

Therefore, this

court lacks jurisdiction to hear this

ippeal due to the

Defendant's untimely filing.
The Utah Supreme Court has reaffirmed this principle
in the case of State v. Johnson, 635 $>.2d 36 (Utah 1981),
wherein it was held that, "the 30-da^ period for filing a
notice of appeal . . .
enlarged by this Court.
dismissed."

is jurisdictional and cannot be
Out-of-time Appeals must be

Id. at 37.

Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utali Court of Appeals also
provides that an appeal must be taken within 30 days.
Subsection (e) of Rule 4 provides for an extension of the
time to appeal upon motion filed withi|n 30 days after
expiration of the original 30-day appeal period.
motion has been filed in this case.

No such

Therefore, this court

should dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT Ii
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO FIND
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF IMPRpPER LOOKOUT
The standard of review for factual findings of a
court sitting without a jury is to give deference to the
trial court and not overturn its findings if they are
adequately supported by the evidence.

Wessel v. Erickson

Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Ut^h 1985).

Moreover,

the standard of review for a bench trikl is "one
approximating the 'clearly erroneous' Standard used in
fede ral courts."

Id. (citations omitted).
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The trial court in this matter was not clearly
erroneous in finding that the Defendant had violated the
law, and the judge's findings are adequately supported by
the evidence.

First, and most important, deference should

be given to the judge, because as the finder of fact he is
the one best able to not only hear the testimony but to
observe the witnesses and to judge their demeanor, and
apparent frankness or lack thereof.

The judge is the one

best able to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.

In

this case, Judge Palmer, based upon his observations,
ascertained that the more credible evidence was that the
Defendant's vehicle had rolled out into the travel portion
of the through street and collided with Mrs. Bailey's
vehicle.

The unrefuted testimony by Officer Sadler was that

the point of impact was in the travel portion of the street.
Mrs. Bailey herself testified that she had not changed her
course of direction.

Even if the trial court found that the

evidence showed that Mrs. Bailey was pulling over, that
finding would not have been determinative.

What is

significant and determinative is the fact that Mrs. Bailey
was still lawfully within her travel lane.

Also of great

importance is the Defendant's own admissions that he moved
his vehicle out into the street at a time when his vision
down the street was obscured by another vehicle.
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This

obviously indicates a failure to keep a proper lookout for
other vehicles on the street.
Concerning Judge Palmer's statement that a driver has
a duty when emerging from a driveway to yield to all
vehicles that may present an immediate hazard, it is
apparent from the record that this statement was preclusory
to his finding that the Defendant did not yield to Mrs.
Bailey.

The reasonable inference tofcfederived therefrom is

that Judge Palmer used this finding tcf support his
conclusion of law that the Defendant did not maintain a
proper lookout.

In any event, this court is obligated

pursuant to the standard of review on appeal to give
deference to the trial court's conclusion unless there is no
reasonable evidence to support that conclusion.
Such other facts which support :he trial court's
conclusion are that the Defendant came out into the street
without stopping, the Defendant's apologetic attitude after
the accident occurred, the Defendant's admission that he
pulled out without being able to see bevond the truck, the
Defendant's admission that he did not bee Mrs. Bailey's
vehicle before the collision, and the jfact that the
Defendant changed his story after a fe|r days.
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ARGUMENT III
THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY
REQUIRED TO PAY RESTITUTION
Counsel for Plaintiff concedes that pursuant to
§76-3-201(3)(a)(i), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), the
trial court is required to make the reasons for restitution
a part of the record.

Counsel for Plaintiff also concedes

that Judge Palmer did not make his reasons a part of the
record.

However, of significance is whether this error

constituted prejudicial error.

The Utah Supreme Court set

forth in the case of State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah
1985), that:
In the case before us, there is ample
record evidence from which the trial
court could have found that restitution
was proper. Notwithstanding the mandate of
the statute that the trial court's reasons
be included as part of its order, we believe
that the failure to do so in this case was
harmless error.
Id. at 614.

Thus, there must be a showing of prejudicial

error in order to overturn the trial court's order of
restitution.
The error of the trial court in not making its
reasons for restitution a part of the record was harmless.
The main fact supporting this conclusion is that when the
question of restitution was raised, the Defendant was
present and before the court at all times.

It is evident

from the record that Judge Palmer asked the Defendant

10

questions with regards to his ability to pay restitution.
The Defendant stated that he did not Ijave liability
insurance and that he did have a par4"-1 time job.

At the

close of the record, it is obvious th4t the Defendant was
still before the trial court as Judge (Palmer ordered him to
pay restitution, and the first $100 h4 paid would go to
restitution, and after this impositiorj, Judge Palmer told
the Defendant he may go.
The Defendant had ample opportunity to question Mrs.
Bailey concerning the deductible amount, to present any
statements of his own, or to object td the imposition of
restitution.

In fact, §76-3-201(3) (c )|, Utah Code Ann. (1953

as amended), provides that the court s|hall hold a hearing on
restitution if an objection is made.

[However, the record is

void of an objection or any questions Iconcerning the
requirement of restitution.

Based on |the facts that all of

the witnesses and the Defendant were pjresent and before the
court when restitution was considered, and that the
defendant did not even question the parties concerning the
amount of restitution, it is clear that it was not
prejudicial in any way to require the ^Defendant to reimburse
Mrs. Bailey for the amount she had to Expend because the
Defendant did not have liability insurance.
Counsel for appellant refers tolno judicial or
statutory law which makes it obligator^ for an order of
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restitution to be based on evidence presented by a witness,
on the witness stand while under oath and subject to
cross-examination.

Seeing as there are no such

requirements, Defendant's arguments to the same are without
merit.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented at trial was more than
adequate to support a conclusion that the Defendant violated
the law by not maintaining a proper lookout.

Also, it was

proper for the court to require restitution to the other
driver.
More importantly, this court lacks jurisdiction
because Defendant's appeal was untimely taken.
Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests this
court to dismiss Defendant's appeal, or in the alternative,
affirm the trial court's conviction of Defendant and
imposition of restitution.
DATED this

" 2 ^

day of July, 1987.

Mark T. Ethington
Sandy City Attorney's Office
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

day of July,

1987, I served four copies of the foregoing Brief of
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Respondent upon the following, by han|d delivering copies
addressed to William G. Fowler, J. Anbus Edwards, FOWLER &
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